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"THE WORST FLOODS IN HISTORY"
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE FLOODS OF 1944
IN THE ELKHORN RIVER BASIN

TODD KERSTETTER
"Damage by Elkhorn Defies Estimation"
-Headline in the Fremont (Nebr.) Guide and Tribune, 13 June 1944

Water has played a critical, even defining,
role in the history of the American West. Typically, scarcity determined water's significance.
Farmers descended of European stock found
too little water in the West to continue their
traditional agriculture. Battles linger to this
day over water rights for irrigation and urban
usage. In a less-examined phenomenon, excess
water has shaped the otherwise arid Plains by
influencing the relationship between humans

and their environment. In Nebraska's Elkhorn
River Basin, a steady history of flooding led
humans to alter the basin in attempts to control or mitigate flooding. Record flooding in
1944 revealed the weaknesses in a series of ad
hoc flood control measures taken during previous decades and spurred basin residents to
recruit federal aid in an effort to control the
Elkhorn once and for all. Although subsequent
flood control projects still could not totally
prevent flooding on the Elkhorn, 1944 marked
the beginning of a new era in the relationship
between basin residents and their environment. This reflected a broader trend in American environmental history, that of bringing
the phenomenal resources of the federal government to bear upon the countryside.
The Elkhorn Basin experiences floods regularly, almost annually, to this day. One of the
earliest written accounts comes from Paul
Wilhelm, Duke ofWiirttemberg, who recorded
in August 1823 a hurricane-like storm that
turned the Elkhorn into a torrent. The river
flooded Indian earth lodges abandoned for the
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summer. When Americans of European descent began settling in the basin in the 1850s,
they located town sites near the river, the better to utilize the Elkhorn's current to power
mills. Placing economic assets such as mills
and homes within the river's reach-the floodplain, not just the usual banks, must be considered any river's natural domain-paved the
way for conflict. During the late 1800s basin
residents coped with flooding simply by rebuilding damaged structures, replanting damaged crops, and, in some areas, as at Norfolk,
by building levees to protect assets from high
water.
The dawn of the twentieth century saw
people in several counties form drainage districts, which were private, quasi-governmental organizations dedicated to improving
drainage within their jurisdictions. The
Elkhorn River Drainage District and the
Elkhorn Valley Drainage District each pursued "improvements" to the river, typically
straightening curved portions of the channel
to facilitate drainage. By 1912 the districts
had completed several such projects, which
accomplished their objectives but only during
rains and floods of limited magnitude.
Between 1910 and 1920, local flood fighters attacked the basin more aggressively. Workers dredged the Elkhorn's final twenty miles
and created a new channel. Tributaries such
as Logan Creek experienced similar modifications, which in some cases made it impossible
to recognize the original channel. Logan
Creek, originally 150 miles long, shrank to
less than one-half its original length. As a result of those efforts flood damage declined.
Piecemeal modifications continued through
the 1930s. Changes ranged from further dredging and channel-straightening projects to small
dams. The basin felt the federal government's
influence in 1935 as Works Progress Administration laborers finished a dam on the Elkhorn's North Fork at Pierce. The resulting lake
provided recreational opportunities in addition to flood control benefits.
Despite efforts to control the Elkhorn, the
basin experienced its worst floods ever in 1940.

During the night of 1 June, a cloudburst
dumped a foot or more of rain on the northcentral basin. Before the week was out, a second storm added more water to the Elkhorn
and its tributaries. Government agencies rangingfrom the University ofN ebraska to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the
Works Progress Administration responded to
the flood crisis, as did the American Red Cross.
A representative from the US Department of
Agriculture visited the basin in July to gather
information about flood damages. Although
little appears to have been done with the data,
it foreshadowed similar efforts that would come
four years later with greater consequences.
Nonetheless, the first ninety years of permanent European-American settlement in the
basin witnessed increasingly complex responses to flooding. People initially acted defensively, building dikes, levees, and floodways
to halt rising water and to divert it from buildings and farmland. Over time, as greater technology and assets became available, responses
to flooding became more aggressive. Humans
altered the river itself as they straightened
and dredged the channel. By 1940 even those
more determined efforts failed to protect property against what was at that time the worst
flooding ever recorded on the Elkhorn. When
devastating floods in 1944 surpassed damage
records set in 1940, people responded even
more aggressively and threatened to remake
the entire basin.!
April showers made the spring of 1944 an
especially wet one in the Elkhorn Basin. That
month saw the beginning of a thirty-day rainy
spell that saturated soils throughout much of
the region. Since the destructive flood of 1940,
three years free of major flooding seemed to
have helped people put wet basements, flooded
towns, and washed-out crops out of mind.
A vailable records indicate residents had done
little, if anything, to change their relationship
with the river and its tributaries since the inundation of 1940. After all, a congressional
report issued ten years earlier deemed the
Elkhorn unworthy of federal flood control
measures because it was neither navigable nor
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FIG . 1. Elkhorn River Basin, Nebraska, and 1944 flood sites. Map drawn by Tracy Smith.

an important producer of hydroelectric power.
Besides, flooding in the basins of the Platte
and its tributaries never amounted to much,
according to the report. Given that background and the drought of the 1930s, 1944's
rainy spring probably had residents preparing
for a typical but unremarkable Elkhorn flood.
Instead, they got two exceptional floods. The
runoff from two severe rainstorms, exacerbated
by the wet spring and saturated soils, produced
a pair of floods that would prod the government to change its stereotype of the region
and change how the basin's residents interacted with the river,z
On Wednesday, 10 May 1944, rain clouds
over the west-central Elkhorn Basin dimmed
the afternoon sun. The large storm covered
portions of eastern Nebraska and parts ofIowa,

South Dakota, and Minnesota. Rains soaked
the upper Elkhorn Basin for nearly two and a
half hours . The rains came again on Thursday,
drenching the same areas. Ten inches of rain
fell at the storm's worst.
Much of the water went overland in an
abnormally high runoff toward streams and
rivers. All streams draining the area registered
high stages after the storm, and the North
Fork flooded. Livestock farmers reported pigs,
hogs, and sheep drowning in the flood. Crop
growers were more fortunate. Because the
waters receded within two days, the flood damaged only limited amounts of the small grains
and alfalfa planted on bottomland. 3
The flood hit the city of Norfolk at about
2:30 A.M. when a two-and-a-half-foot tall wall
of water from the Elkhorn's North Fork broke
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FIG. 2. Large pieces of ice on Highway 32 going west from West Point, Nebraska, in 1960 flood. Ice was left
when flood waters dropped after covering west end of town. Flood stage was 16.09 feet at the river bridge-3 .09 feet
over flood stage. Courtesy of Nebraska State Historical Society. Photograph by William Reinsch, Soil
Conservation Service.

over the city's dikes and headed for a dance
hall. The flood wave wrenched the 144-foot
by 87 -foot building from its foundation and
carried it intact to the bridge over the North
Fork at Third Street and Elm A venue. According to the owner, previous floods had risen
slowly and held to the river's course. The flood
washed out five area highway bridges by Saturday, 13 May.4
Once out of its banks, the stream flooded
an estimated 861 acres in and around Norfolk
to depths reaching four feet. 5 The water
reached two to three feet higher than the previous high water mark in the city, transforming the area into a giant lake. While the North
Fork flooded the city from the north and east,
the Elkhorn rose from its banks to flood the
city's south side. Cresting at one and a half
feet above flood stage late on Friday, 12 May,

or early on Saturday 13 May, the Elkhorn drove
people from their south-side homes as it
reached as far west as Second Street.
Receding waters revealed the flood's handiwork. The business district and a large residential area-176 city blocks total-were hit
by the waters of either the Elkhorn or the
North Fork. High water damaged 177 businesses and 459 homes and forced between 300
and 400 people to leave their homes, about
100 of them by boat. The flood interrupted
telephone, power, and railroad services and
left a heavy deposit of mud and slime.
Commercial losses included disrupted rail
service, lost inventory, and grocers suffered
from an embargo placed upon the sale of any
goods touched by flood waters-an effort to
prevent an epidemic of floodborne diseases.
Vegetables normally eaten raw, such as let-
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tuce, were to be destroyed. So, too, were
canned and bottled goods. Authorities filed
charges on Monday, 15 May, against a merchant who sold contaminated bottled and
canned goods. Other food, such as corn or
beans, that would be boiled before consumption were exempt from the embargo. Merchants who sold goods other than food lost
business as they closed for up to ten days to
clean debris from their flooded stores. 6
Although the May flood surpassed previous marks in the upper basin, where old-timers said water reached about a foot higher than
the previous high water mark, the lower basin
also felt the flood's effects. It hit West Point
on Sunday, 14 May. Early that morning the
Elkhorn began rising at about six inches per
hour as it reached into the city park and
Cuming County fairgrounds. The high water,
which reached within eighteen inches of the
record height set by the 1940 flood in West
Point, disrupted traffic on Highway 275 and
caused delays in rail traffic for several days. 7
One month to the day after the May storm
hit, rains again drenched eastern Nebraska and
parts of southeastern South Dakota, western
Iowa, Kansas, and Minnesota. A heavy thunderstorm centered over the headwaters of
Maple and Pebble Creeks in the lower Elkhorn
Basin dumped as much as fifteen inches of
rain. Within six hours, an average of twelve
inches of precipitation fell at the storm's center. 8
As in May, soils could not absorb the runoff
produced by the intense storm. The swollen
Elkhorn covered an area about fifty miles long
by twenty miles wide in the lower basin. Tributary flooding inundated an additional 61,000
acres. A gauging station recorded a peak four
times the station's previous record high. The
surging Elkhorn raised the Platte River to flood
stage from its confluence with the Elkhorn to
its mouth and added enough water to a moderately high Missouri River to cause severe
flooding from the mouth of the Platte to St.
Joseph, Missouri. With early flood damage
estimates for the basin reaching into the millions of dollars, residents in the lower basin
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called the June 1944 flood the "worst flood in
history."9
As the flood receded, increasingly accurate
damage reports became available. A Red Cross
survey in Dodge County placed primary blame
on the Elkhorn for floods that hit 92,480 of
Dodge County's 341,779 acres-slightly less
than 27 percent of the county's area. That
land held about 25 percent of the county's
corn crop. The flood destroyed seven homes,
damaged 743 more, and destroyed 121 barns
and outbuildings, damaging another 354. The
flood wrecked 1,500 miles offencing, twentyfive pieces offarm machinery, and 1,000 additional pieces of farm machinery were damaged.
Almost 161 businesses, churches, and schools
also sustained flood damage. Livestock also
suffered heavily. Estimates placed Dodge
County's losses at fifteen horses and mules,
456 head of cattle, 1,800 hogs and pigs, 225
sheep, and 120,000 poultry. Receding floodwaters scattered thousands of animal corpses,
so not only their loss but also their disposal
added to the flood's costs. IO
Amid the death and destruction, some fauna
thrived in the flood's aftermath. Seedcorn
beetles, which feed on the hearts of seedcorn
kernels, multiplied in the moist conditions.
Infestation reports first surfaced about ten days
after the flood. A farmer who planted fifty
acres of corn one Thursday evening lost most
of that field to the beetles by the following
morning. Extension agents urged farmers to
pack the soil firmly in their cornfields to discourage the burrowing pests. In addition to
obvious damage, this kind of collateral dam~ge escalated the flood's impact on the basinY
Nebraskans outside the basin also felt the
effects of the flood when they tried to use its
transportation networks. Fremont, separated
from Omaha by the Elkhorn, could rely on
only one road, Highway 77, to carry traffic out
of the city, and no trains entered or left on the
morning of 12 June. The June freshet disrupted
service on the Chicago and Northwestern
Railroad in the basin. Repair crews would need
two weeks to restore most service, although

184

GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 2001

FIG. 3. The Elkhorn River flood damage on the]. L. Blair property, seven miles northwest of Battle Creek,
Madison County, Nebraska, in March 1960 flood. Courtesy of Nebraska State Historical Society. Photography

by V. Van, Soil Conservation Service.

disruptions lingered for months on some
lines. 12
Human psyches suffered, too. Robert Leisy,
a sixty-one-year-old farmer whose land south
of Wisner flooded inJune, shot and killed himself on the 14th of that month. Although impossible to attribute directly to the flood, it
was speculated that, with all of the other problems in his life, the damage to his farm by the
flood may have provided the proverbial "last
straw" that led him to take his life.13

The massive, varied devastation wrought
by 1944's record-breaking flood elicited the
most comprehensive and concerted responses
from residents, government agencies, and
charitable organizations yet. Within ten days
of the May flood, the Norfolk Drainage Board,
acting on orders from the Corps of Engineers,
began repairs on the dike ruptured on 12 May.
The Red Cross fed, clothed, and housed families flooded from their homes. While still completing relief work from the May flood, the
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Red Cross aided victims of the June flood. At
its Fremont headquarters, the Red Cross daily
prepared 4,500 meals, which it distributed to
relief centers in the basin. Units of the Nebraska National Guard rushed into the field
shortly after the flood hit on Sunday, June 14.
Other civic groups such as the American Legion and Auxiliary and fire departments also
joined the relief effort. One village, Hooper,
organized an impromptu "lost and found" on
an empty lot. Authorities encouraged people
to bring items that had washed onto their property to the lot where, authorities hoped, the
owners would claim them. 14 At the county
level, officials juggled budgets and raised taxes
to pour money into road and bridge repairs.
The state aided flooded farmers by suggesting
replanting strategies and canvassing the state
to obtain seed. Federal government responses
included a flood warning system courtesy of
the US Weather Bureau. 15
The most important federal response, however, came in reassessing its evaluation of the
Elkhorn Basin. Led by the US Army Corps of
Engineers, a number of local, state, and federal agencies, in cooperation with residents,
researched and analyzed flooding and flood
damage in the Elkhorn Basin. Washington's
view of the basin had taken shape during the
late 1920s. In the 308 Report on the Platte
River-one of about 200 such reports on US
streams prepared as called for in the Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1927-the government
concluded the Platte Basin, including the
Elkhorn, did not suffer destructive flooding.
Although the Flood Control Act of 1936 saw
the government assume responsibility for controlling flooding on rivers, which, when
flooded menaced national welfare through loss
of life, erosion, or impaired transportation and
commerce, the 308 Report caused the government to overlook the Elkhorn. 16 The postmortem investigation of the 1944 floods would
change this assessment.
The political climate in 1944 also favored
reviewing the Elkhorn's status. That summer
found Congress embroiled in the Missouri
Basin Project, better known as the Pick-Sloan
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Plan, which called for reclamation and flood
control projects throughout the Missouri Basin, which included the Elkhorn. Severe flooding on the Missouri River in 1943 prompted
the House Flood Control Committee to ask
the Corps of Engineers to review the Missouri
River for flood control options. The corps assigned Colonel Lewis A. Pick, then division
engineer of the corps' Missouri River office
in Omaha, to the task. Pick composed a response that employed multiple-purpose dams
to control flooding and provide possible irrigation and power production. This broke with
the corps' traditional duty of working on navigation projects. W. G. Sloan, an engineer in
the Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, had also been working on a development plan for the Missouri. Congress received
the plans, Pick's emphasizing flood control,
Sloan's emphasizing irrigation and hydroelectric power production, in February and
May 1944, respectively. As the Elkhorn
flooded in 1944, Congress studied the two
plans, which it would eventually fuseY The
time seemed ripe to produce a new relationship between the Elkhorn and the people living in its basin.
On 21 June 1944 the House Committee on
Flood Control ordered a survey of the Elkhorn
Basin to determine if conditions justified federally financed flood control measures. Beginning with a pair of flood damage hearings, on
29 August at Norfolk and on 30 August at
Fremont, the corps reviewed the conclusions
of the 308 Report, evaluating the Elkhorn's
flooding through firsthand consultation with
local residents. IS
In preparation for the hearings, several
towns held organizational meetings to discuss
the flood's damages and to explore options for
preventing or limiting future damages by the
Elkhorn and its tributaries. On 23 June, Hooper
held one of the earliest such meetings, attended by forty to fifty people representing
the county extension department, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, bankers,
newspapers, the Red Cross, the Farm Security Administration, and the Reconstruction
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Finance Corporation. The gathering included
mayors or other city officials of every Dodge
County town, except North Bend, who met to
discuss flood issues. 19 With this kind of preparation, they hoped to make a strong case for
assistance.
Testimony at the Norfolk hearing indicated
flood damages came to more than double the
damages suffered in the 1940 flood. The 1944
floods caused especially heavy losses because
they happened so late in the growing season
that some farmland had to go unused. In most
earlier floods, farmers replanted successfully
after waters receded. Russell Young, a farmer
from Tilden with thirty-four acres of bottomland, testified that it "produces real good every year," but that "we never had anything
this year at all." Young went on to tell the
corps that the floods occurred often and "every one seems to be getting a little worse." A
con&ensus of the farmers surveyed for the hearing agreed that floods had been getting progressively worse during their years on the
Elkhorn. 20
Overall, those testifying believed that the
Elkhorn and its tributaries should be straightened and widened and that reservoirs should
be built at tributaries' headwaters to slow the
flow of water into the main stem during flood
situations. Generally speaking, laymen, mostly
farmers, advocated local channel modifications
and levees while those with technical training
advocated similar responses on a basinwide
scale. Testimony given the next day in Fremont from lower basin residents echoed that
of their upstream neighbors. They recommended the corps straighten and widen the
Elkhorn's channel and build dikes and levees
to protect low areas. The crowd realized, however, that it would be virtually impossible to
prevent a disaster similar to the floods caused
by the intense flash rains of June 1944. In
some cases, they acknowledged, nature just
could not be contained. 21 However, it could,
perhaps, be managed so that floods would not
be as devastating.
Members of the local media agreed. Days
after the hearings, the Fremont Guide and Tri-

bune editorialized that localized control
projects were not the answer. Local protection projects might successfully save one town
from the ravages of a flood, but that town's
dikes and levees would merely divert the water to another location, which, if left unprotected, would suffer more than it would have
otherwise. According to the Guide and Tribune, the Elkhorn needed a comprehensive,
basinwide management plan. 22
Before engineers began their survey, Congressman Karl Stefan of Norfolk warned his
constituents that the federal government did
not have funds available for extensive flood
control on the Elkhorn. Stefan promised to
visit the flooded locales with an engineer from
the corps' Omaha district and that an official
army survey would be made. From the survey,
Stefan told members of the West Point Community Club, individual towns would be able
to draw suggestions for local flood protection
projects. But Congress, he told them, had little
money available except to finance minor construction work such as "a small dike here and
a bit of revetment there."23
Nonetheless, the government apparently
listened to the advice given at the Norfolk
and Fremont hearings. In the following years,
the Corps of Engineers surveyed the entire
basin, conducting an inspection of existing
protection projects and the sites of all specific
improvements suggested in testimony at the
hearings. Portions of the basin, including the
upper reaches of the Elkhorn, the upper reaches
of the North Fork, and the upper portions of
Cedar, Logan, Union, Humbug, Plum, Pebble,
Maple, Rawhide, and Bell Creeks, merited no
flood control measures in the eyes of the corps.
Some of these areas simply did not flood, or
did not flood often enough or seriously enough
to warrant expensive modifications. In other
areas, serious flood damages occurred only
during the 1944 floods. In some of these places,
notably in areas whose elevations placed them
above possible flood damage from streams,
damages resulted from the intense nature of
the rainstorms and from overland runoff rather
than from streams overflowing their banks. 24
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FIG. 4. Bridge across Elkhorn River near J.L. Blair property, 2.5 miles east and 1 mile north of Battle Creek,
Nebraska, in March 1960 flood. Courtesy of Nebraska State Historical Society. Photograph by V. Van, Soil
Conservation Service.

Using information gathered from the hearings and surveys, the corps drafted four comprehensive improvement plans, which included a
number of local protection projects that could
be undertaken individually. Comprehensive
Plan A called for improvements to the Elkhorn
and its tributaries that would protect against
floods of the magnitude of a "super flood"
comparable to the 1944 inundation from
Neligh to the river's mouth. Levees and channel modifications would provide the means
for protection along both the Elkhorn and its
tributaries. Plan B aimed at flood protection
along the Elkhorn and its tributaries from
Norfolk to the river's mouth against floods
about half the magnitude of the 1944 flood by
using levees and channel modifications to
eliminate large and objectionable bends. Essentially the same as Plan A, Plan B would
merely provide protection against floods of

lesser magnitude and would not include the
area from Neligh to Norfolk. Plan C contained
the same details as Plan A but with the addition of a flood control reservoir. Plan 0 called
for a larger, multipurpose reservoir that would
allow for not only flood control but also for
hydroelectric power generation and irrigation. 25
The corps also suggested a series of twelve
local flood protection projects that could be
undertaken by cities or towns in partnership
with the federal government. These projects,
which were excerpts from the comprehensive
plans, would allow residents to protect strategic portions of the floodplain, usually towns,
and avoid the prohibitive expense of improving the entire length of the river. Areas recommended for projects included the North
Fork at Pierce and Norfolk; Giles, Buffalo,
Battle, and Meskenthine Creeks; and the
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Elkhorn at West Point, Scribner, Hooper,
Winslow, Waterloo, and in an area above the
river's mouth. Some projects involved levees
and channel diversions or modifications. For
example, the town of Pierce would be protected against floods equal to the magnitude
of the town's worst flood by a two-mile-long
levee on the south, east, and north sides of
town. In addition, about 1,700 feet of the
North Fork's channel would be enlarged and
relocated south of the town's park to handle
flows that would normally overwhelm the capacity of the Pierce Dam. The dam's spillway
and downstream channel would also be modified to improve their drainage abilities. 26
Most of the local protection projects consisted simply of minimal channel modifications and levees to be built around cities as a
bulwark against high water. Such would be
the case for agricultural areas along the North
Fork from Pierce to its mouth. The North
Fork's channel would be widened in places
and straightened where "objectionable" bends
constrained flowY
Some waterways, such as Giles Creek,
earned more aggressive recommendations from
the corps. The corps suggested blocking the
original channel west of Tilden and sending
Giles into a levee-enclosed diversion channel
about 9,700 feet long that would empty into
the Elkhorn. An especially steep gradient
through the town of Stanton earned Mesken thine Creek, too, a recommendation for
aggressive treatment from the corps. Since the
channel's steep fall created the potential for
flood flows of destructive velocity, the corps
proposed to line the channel with concrete
where it flowed through the city and surround
the concrete channel with six-foot-high
levees. 28
While straightening and enlarging the
channels of the Elkhorn and its tributaries
found wide support among residents, engineers
found that implementing such improvements
basinwide would be economically infeasible.
In making that decision, the corps relied upon
estimates of past and future flood damages on
the Elkhorn and its tributaries. Estimates for
future damages often exceed estimates of past

annual damages by multiples. The corps predicted an increase in the severity of flood damage through an increase in the frequency and
magnitude of flooding, an increase in floodplain development and the attendant higher
potential for damage, or a combination thereof.
The figures show that much of the Elkhorn's
flood prone-segment-from Neligh to the
mouth-was rural, making basinwide improvement inefficient. Furthermore, the corps speculated that flood-proofing such regions would
not encourage enough development of those
areas to merit the expense of protecting them.
Although the rural areas held rich agricultural land and would incur high future flood
damages, the corps deemed flood damages in
those stretches too diffuse to justify the cost of
basinwide flood control measures. But near
towns and cities, flood control measures would
provide the most concentrated benefits for the
least expense. 29
Addressing the proposed plans purely in
terms of flood control, the comprehensive
plans seemed to offer the best approach to
minimizing flood damages along the Elkhorn.
The logistics of drainage, runoff, and flooding
within a river basin system would indicate that
a piecemeal approach would fail or create problems in some areas as they are solved in others.
The history of the Elkhorn's drainage districts
confirms that. Successful reduction of flood
damages along Logan Creek came from modifying nearly the entire length of the creek and
maintaining the improvements over time. In
areas where only portions of streams were
modified or where modifications were allowed
to deteriorate, such as those along Rawhide
Creek, results were less successful. Also, the
demise of some drainage districts in a quagmire of litigation showed that saving one location from flooding often meant harming
another with increased runoff.
Furthermore, flood studies show that a
stream's floodplain should be treated as a complete unit. Engineers now operate under the
assumption that building within the floodplain
increases flooding. Visualizing the floodplain
as a paper cup aids in understanding this concept. Under normal conditions the river flows
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within its banks, or the analogous paper cup is
about half full of water. When the river floods,
it fills its floodplain, going to the top of its
natural channel, or the paper cup fills to the
rim. But building in the floodplain displaces
the river's normal flow, forcing floodwater out
of the floodplain. Using the paper cup analogy, building in the flood plain has the same
effect as if a person holding the cup squeezed
it, thus forcing excess water to spill over the
sides. 30 That analogy illustrates the virtue of
comprehensively isolating a river's floodplain,
the true limits of the stream's channel, for the
purposes of flood control.
Environmentally speaking, treating the
entire floodplain as a unit also makes sense.
As the preceding discussion shows, encroachment into a stream's floodplain forces flood
flows higher than they would normally reach.
Thus, humans not only subjected their structures in the flood plain to water damage but
also extended damage to structures that otherwise would have been beyond the natural
floodplain. Aside from vacating the floodplain,
which would appear to be out of the question
given the amount of time and money invested
in it, limiting human intrusion and giving the
river its berth is a reasonable course.
But politics and economics complicated
the world into which the corps' recommendations came. People had already intruded
into the floodplain and for nearly a century
had become ever more firmly entrenched and
committed to remaining on the floodplain.
To implement the comprehensive plans would
require cooperation from a myriad oflocal governments to gain rights-of-way and, in the cases
of Plans C and D, uprooting two towns in toto.
Implementation would also require allocating
exorbitant sums of money for comparatively
insignificant returns. The total cost of constructing PlanA would be $34,366,500; of Plan
B, $29,198,800; of Plan C, $76,138,900; of
Plan D, $84,478,200. Once constructed, the
economic benefits of these projects would be
exceeded by their maintenance costs.3!
Given the complications associated with
the comprehensive plans, local protection
projects became the most economically and
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politically attractive avenue to minimize flood
damage. These projects were comparatively
inexpensive and, in most cases, provided estimated annual flood control benefits greater
than their annual maintenance costs. Most
important, these projects concentrated on
small areas and protected concentrations of
wealth and people-municipalitiesY
In some cases, the local protection approach
made cooperation easy to obtain when the
corps presented its recommendations to basin
residents at Fremont and Norfolk in November 1946 and in subsequent meetings with local officials. Various city and county councils
endorsed most of the local plans, which meant
committing to provide land, rights-of-way, and
easements at no cost to the federal government, releasing the federal government from
liability stemming from damages due to the
construction work, agreeing to make necessary alterations to highways and bridges affected by the projects, and agreeing to maintain
the projects after their completion. 33
Yet in other cases, the decision by local
governments not to participate in the recommended project indicated that more than economics was involved. For example, the projects
recommended for Buffalo Creek, Scribner,
Hooper, and Winslow offered some of the most
favorable cost-benefit ratios. The village board
of Meadow Grove rejected the Buffalo Creek
project because it could not obtain waivers
from landowners along the creek who believed
they might be injured if the project were completed. The reluctance of Meadow Grove's
citizens to agree to the plan might come from
their opinion that their flood troubles stemmed
from highway and railroad embankments interfering with Buffalo Creek's drainage. At the
Norfolk flood damage hearing, Meadow
Grove's mayor, Leonard Sanne, asked for a
ditch to be cut through the embankments to
allow water to drain on its natural course. With
an apparently simple solution at hand, people
in Meadow Grove likely thought the corps'
proposal too elaborate. Scribner's city council
simply felt its project was undesirable. Hooper's
village board rejected the project slated for its
jurisdiction because it feared high maintenance
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costs and legal tangles that might result from
the project's construction. Winslow sent the
issue to its citizens, who rejected it because of
its expense and the feeling that the project
was unnecessary. 34
Curbing flood damage in a piecemeal fashion through local protection projects is less
desirable for the environment than a comprehensive approach. It treats the floodplain neither as a unit nor a natural part of the river.
This approach is inconsistent because it protects some areas of greater human wealth, yet
leaves open to further injury areas of lesser
human wealth. For the same reasons, it does
not bode well for the natural mechanisms of
the river and riparian lands and systems because water is artificially channeled in some
places and not in others. Norfolk's city engineer, H. H. Tracy, put it nicely when he testified at Norfolk that "in channel straightening
there is no place in anyone locality to commence work or to stop, as the entire river is a
series of convolutions across county after
county."J5
While economically and politically expedient, the local solutions epitomized the environmentally unsound, shortsighted use of
technology condemned by historian Donald
Worster. In his book Dust Bowl: The Southern
Plains in the 1930s, Worster criticized inappropriately applied agricultural technology for
exacerbating the Plains' natural drought cycle
during the 1930s to create the Dust Bowl. The
"ecological insensitivity of our culture," as
Worster put it, was also at work in the development of the Elkhorn Basin. To make matters
worse, cultural insensitivity to the environment, at work from the beginning, may have
been heightened by the involvement of the
federal bureaucracies, which Worster describes
as "innately anti-ecological" because they were
"too insulated from the results of their actions
to learn, to adjust, to harmonize."36
In his recent study of California's rivers
and how they have been changed by human
activity, with a focus on flood control projects,
Jeffrey F. Mount 37 echoes these conclusions.
During the same era the Elkhorn underwent
piecemeal flood control modifications, a num-

ber of California rivers experienced similar
treatments resulting from social and political
processes very like those that occurred in Nebraska. This reflected the fact that although
the Corps of Engineers has often stated a desire to develop basin-based solutions to flood
control and other river modifications, it has
instead often pursued piecemeal approaches.
Mount found that piecemeal approaches in
California provided short-term local solutions,
but created long-term basin-wide problems,
including long-term costs that could have been
avoided by adopting a basin based plan. He
suggests that basin based solutions also adopt
what might be termed gentler approaches. For
instance, levees might be built farther from
the river channel than has been the case so
the river might continue to develop its natural equilibrium with the landscape. In the long
run, he concludes, working with a river's natural processes this way reduces impact on the
watershed and flood-related costs.
Of the twelve local protection projects recommended by the corps, only six, those at
Norfolk, Pierce, Giles Creek, Battle Creek,
West Point, and Waterloo, met the dual criteria of cost-effectiveness and local support that
would lead the corps to recommend to Congress that it assist residents in curbing floods
and flood damage in the Elkhorn Basin, which
the corps did in submitting its findings to the
House of Representatives. Of these six projects,
all or portions of five were eventually built.
Construction began on the Norfolk project in
May 1966 and was completed in December
1968, the Pierce project was under construction from September 1963 to May 1964, West
Point from June 1963 to June 1964, and Waterloo from May 1966 to April 1967. The
levees proposed for the Battle Creek project
were abandoned in favor of 800 feet of riprap,
completed in March 1973 along both banks of
the creek to protect the embankments for the
bridge on State Route 121. The federal government abandoned the Giles Creek project
in November 1977. All or portions of two other
local protection projects designed by the corps,
but not recommended for construction, were
later built: channel modifications to Buffalo
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Creek at Meadow Grove were completed in
May 1973, and a levee around most of Hooper
was finished in November 1966. Other corps
projects in the basin include a stone embankment to protect a bridge abutment on the
Elkhorn River near Norfolk (completed May
1973), channel enlargements to Union and
Taylor Creeks near Madison (completed May
1966), levees along Middle Fork Maple Creek
near Clarkson (completed but date not available), a bank stabilization project on Logan
Creek near Bancroft (completed February
1972), and a 120-foot riprap on the Elkhorn's
right bank to protect the Q Street bridge abutment near Gretna {completed in February
1972).38
The most comprehensive, intensively researched response to flooding in the basin's
history, then, did not attempt to dominate the
river. Rather, it limited action to defending
areas of concentrated capital where local interests would support the response. In light of
the benefits of a comprehensive and coordinated flood control plan, the hit-and-miss
democratic application of the corps' recommendations makes the response seem haphazard. Responses applied according to economic
and political expedience limited manipulation
of riparian lands but failed to treat the floodplain as a whole. In the short run, that may
have been the best result for the river system
and may have inadvertently prevented further bureaucratic ecological insensitivity of
the type Worster criticized. In the long run, it
left the floodplain open to uncoordinated development inconsistent with the floodplain
and vulnerable to the cultural insensitivity
about which Worster wrote. It would be years
before government agencies would adopt a
comprehensive approach to floodplain planning. 39 Until that happened, the people got
what they asked for. Whether the basin got
what it needed remains to be seen.
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